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This paper is part of an investigation of the relationship between planning and citizenship, and considers the
contribution of British Idealists because it advances of almost a century the contribution given by Marshall in the
‘50s of the last century, which is usually the starting point of contemporary debates on citizenship. British Idealists
takes on the not easy task of reconciling a liberal and lay vision with the need of an ethical base of the State.
Idealists’ contributions change the role given to the State by the tradition of the liberal political thought and
establish key issues to contemporary reflections on citizenship and social State. From the planning practice point of
view Idealists’ contribution is especially interesting because it is based on the notions of citizenship and common
good, keywords for planning and, unsurprisingly, Idealists’ influence on planning culture, is mostly on Geddes.
Despite a lay political culture has difficulties in sharing their religious approach, it must be acknowledged that
Idealists face issues and problems which were and continue to be relevant for the contemporary debate.Background
Many years ago I understood that land use planning ac-
tions have effects on citizenship. Although these effects
are often involuntary or unaware, they are important be-
cause they change social and political citizenship of the
people living in the planned area. Due to these effects
citizenship might become an evaluation standard of land
use planning actions.
This paper is part of an investigation of the relation-
ship between planning and citizenship, and considers
the contribution of British Idealists because it advances
of almost a century the contribution given by Marshall
in the ‘50s of the last century, which is usually the star-
ting point of contemporary debates on citizenship.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the years
of Cerdà and Geddes, a strong cultural and political in-
fluence was exerted by the Idealist school, a small group
of philosophers based in Oxford and Scotlanda. The
Idealist contribution is useful for understanding prob-
lems and ideas of that period and identifying some au-
thors who influenced planning culture, in particular the,
not always understandable, Geddes’ writingsb.Correspondence: luigi.mazza@polimi.it
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in any medium, provided the original work is pBritish Idealists takes on the not easy task of reconcil-
ing a liberal and lay vision with the need of an ethical
base of the State. Idealists’ contributions change the role
given to the State by the tradition of the liberal political
thought and establish key issues to contemporary reflec-
tions on citizenship and social State.
According to Vincent and Plant − to whom we particu-
larly refer in this paper − Idealists see the role of the
State not merely “as a set of instrumentalities for secur-
ing material welfare, but as the focus of a sense of com-
munity and citizenship, an institution in which a good
common to all classes and recognizable by all interest
groups could be articulated. The purpose of the State
was to promote the good life of its citizens and to de-
velop the moral nature of man”c. Idealists redesign the
liberal political philosophy and are crucial for the devel-
opment of social democracy and the creation of New
Liberalism, whose roots are in the 1880s. Idealist polit-
ical theory is a key to understand the internal contradic-
tions of the State, caused by the secularization process;
contradictions which have main consequences on plan-
ning processes, on the opportunities for designing a
planning system and getting it working properly.n Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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contribution is especially interesting because it is based
on the notions of citizenship and common good, key-
words for planning and, unsurprisingly, Idealists’ influ-
ence on planning culture, is mostly on Geddesd.
Despite a lay political culture has difficulties in sharing
their religious approach, it must be acknowledged that
Idealists face issues and problems which were and con-
tinue to be relevant for the contemporary debate.
An important philosophical school
During the middle of the nineteenth century, notwith-
standing a political context less fragmented than the pre-
sent one, supported by a strong feeling of the nation and
guaranteed by a national and imperial culture, British
society had to face problems and anxieties produced by
the social and economic transformations linked to the
industrial revolution. In a condition both of strength and
uncertainty, the problem of finding an agreement be-
tween a liberal and secular vision and the need of an
ethical basis for the State is the core of British Idealists
reflection. Idealists’ philosophical school begin to estab-
lish its roots in Scotland and Oxford and rapidly become
the dominant philosophy until the turn of the twentieth
century.
Despite internal differences of opinion, British Idealists
exert a strong influence on the political debate which in
those years is beginning to discuss the basic features of the
welfare State. Idealists directly address many of the anxie-
ties of the time, and provide a coherent and attractive al-
ternative to conventional utilitarian and naturalistic
thought. The contributions given by the British Idealists
change the role assigned to the State from the tradition of
political liberal thought and constitute the starting point of
the contemporary reflection on citizenship and welfaree.
Moreover Idealists’ political theory allows a better un-
derstanding of the State’s internal contradiction produced
by the secularization process; a contradiction which has
heavy consequences for the planning practices, in particu-
lar for the design and effectiveness of a planning system.
From our point of view their contribution is interesting
because its core is formed by the notions of citizenship
and common good within the perspective of the welfare
State. These are key words for planning and unsurpris-
ingly it is possible to recognize Idealists influence on the
planning culture, in particular on Patrick Geddesf.
Finally, Idealists give a more correct and complete per-
spective to the contemporary debate on citizenship, their
contribution moves back of almost a century the begin-
ning of the debate, usually considered proceeding from
the contribution given by Marshall in the 1950s.
In conclusion, their religious approach and the solu-
tions they offer are hardly shared by a secular political
culture, characterized by a diffused moral pluralism.However, Idealists consider problems which continue to
maintain their relevance for the current debates.
A metaphysical theory of politics
We must not be biased by the label of idealism, central
to Idealists’ theoretical proposal is the human experi-
ence, an experience which is considered continuously
penetrated and enlightened by the divinity and guided
by ideals which animate it and give it a concrete form.
T. H. Green, generally considered the pivotal figure of
the school, writes: “Not the admission of an ideal world
of guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical, but
the recognition of the empirical itself as an ideal … that
only valid idealism which trusts not to a guess about
what is beyond experience, but an analysis of what is
within it”g. And within it Green perceives the deity who
works unseen behind what he calls “the outer world”h,
and “pours the truth and love which transforms man’s
capabilities into actualities”i. Green thinks that the ele-
ment in which lies the nerve of all progress “is the pres-
ence and everlasting vitality of ideals. … To frame ideals
Green believes to be of the essence of man’s nature”j.
Green finds the ideal in the experience, and recognizes it
as more real than any or all of the particular experiences
in which he finds it.
This religious approach is a key aspect of the meta-
physical foundation of their political theory and can be
properly understood if we consider that in those years
principles permeating a true secular Liberalism were
nothing else but the application to public affairs of a re-
ligious spirit, “Religion became, for many, virtually syn-
onymous of civic service and citizenship. … Morality
was, therefore, central to the economic and political life
of man”k. Religion was view by the Idealists, in general,
as an inextricable part of the process of self-realisation.
The divine and the human constitute the inseparable
spiritual unity of the worldl.
Idealists locate their way of understanding a collective
action, the common good and freedom, in a metaphys-
ical theory which claimed to state, in a more rational
form: “the essence of the Christianity, and to do this in a
way which largely by-passed the historical basis of that
religion - a basis which was being increasingly contested
during the second half of the nineteenth century. The
wedding together of social and political theory with a
powerful defence of Christianity, which at the same time
drew upon but transformed some of the sources of con-
temporary doubt, gave to Idealism a force which it might
not otherwise have had”m. The design of this wedding
was eased by the conviction of many Idealists that a
Christian moral consciousness was already implicit and
immanent in the minds of citizens and therefore it was
just necessary to give it a secularized form of politics
and moral theoryn.
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Vincent and Plant open their book on the British Ideal-
ists quoting MacIntyre who argues that Green “tried to
inaugurate a new concept of citizenship which would
link men of different social classes. The concept was
based upon the notion that there was a good common
to members of all classes, a goal the existence of which
could be made visible in actual measures of educational
reform and social welfare”o.
The new concept of citizenship is based on a concept
of freedom which marks the New Liberalism. A positive
freedom linked to the idea of self-realization, to the
actualization and development of one's possible self. A
freedom which consists of motivated actions, that is to
say those actions which involve the transformation of
impulses to serve those ends and purposes with which
one has identified oneself. An idea of freedom as being
the ability and power to make the best of one's self and
as such being part of divine disclosure in the human per-
sonp. An idea of freedom as social and overall moral
emancipation, Green writes: “We who were reformers
from the beginning always said that the enfranchisement
of the people was an end in itself. We said, and we were
very much derided for saying so, that only citizenship
makes the moral man; that only citizenship gives that self
respect which is the true basis of respect for others, and
without which there is no lasting social order or real
morality. (emphasis added)q. With few exceptions, for
many British Idealists, philosophy is integrally related to
practical life and should be directed to improve the con-
dition of societyr.
Green and Bradley both associated morality with self-
realisation, which unlike pleasure, was the object of moral
action. Bradley, for example, argues that self-realisation is
a moral duty. We have a duty to realise our best self. Self-
realisation is thus directly associated with the common
good. The common good is inconceivable apart from
membership in a society, and the self that is to be realised
through moral activity “determined, characterised, made
what it is by relations to others”s. According to Green
society is “the condition of the development of our
personality”.
Citizenship is secured through a standard of property
and security. Its development is guaranteed by the op-
portunities of rational community lifet.
Freedom and individuality are for most of Idealists in-
extricably linked to citizenship, that is, to the idea of
self-development within a civilised society. Freedom is
not, therefore associated with the absence of constraints,
but, rather with acting in accordance with the higher
good, or general will of the community. Freedom is as-
sociated with choice, yet to act rationally is to make
choices in conformity with one’s highest interests. The
existence of poverty, social deprivation, and appallingconditions of work are quite simply incompatible with
these ideals. Economics has to be subordinate to moral-
ity, and the State as a sustainer of the moral community
has to take an active role providing the conditions in
which this transformations can take place. Rights thus
always belong to individuals as members of a commu-
nity. They are justifiable claims recognised as rational
and necessary for the common goodu. There is a consid-
erable ambiguity in Green’s notion of common good.
The ambiguity arises through the conflicting ideas that it
is impossible to realize the common good in a competi-
tive society, and that competition is necessaryv.
A social philosophy which places conceptions such
citizenship and the common good at the very centre
of its understanding of society has to be preoccupied
with those factors which weaken the integration of ci-
tizens into society. One of the major factors making
for a lack of integration in modern society is poverty.
The problem with poverty is how to alleviate it in a
manner consistent with the principles of civil societyw.
Two responses at the problem: an individualised one
which looks at the responsibility of the individual for
his own deprivation and sees ways to enable him to
overcome poverty through his own efforts. The other
response is community-orientated: the settlement move-
mentx seeks to influence and permeate the way of life
of a local community so that the community can
help itself to identify its problems and seek solutions
to themy.
Citizenship is understood not just as a legal status or
habitual rule following, but an active reflective moral en-
gagement. Green’s arguments on citizenship show the
deep-rooted metaphysical themes implicit within our
political understanding and the practices of citizenship.
He tries to show us the forms of thought which accom-
pany such practices as citizenship. In this sense citizen-
ship is unavoidably both political and metaphysical.
Morality and citizenship are essentially training in self-
development, but without any really detailed discussion
of how they would moralize the marketz. Geddes has a
similar belief on morality, while about the market he on
one hand shares Ruskin’s argument, on the other tries to
develop his own without properly develop it.
In conclusion, an idea of citizenship which looks at men’s
abilities, to status and equality of opportunity in a competi-
tive society. The question remains though, whether equal-
ity of citizenship can be maintained with inequality of
income, and further, can social rights to citizenship exist
within the nexus of a capitalistic market society?aa
Citizenship, common good and rights
Citizenship, understood in a metaphysical framework, is
the central category of Green’s political philosophy. Citi-
zenship implies a consciousness of the moral ends of
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ture of the State; in other words, a consciousness of the
common goodab.
The common good is recognized as the possibility of
better developing ones skills, and allowing others to do
likewise and thus is in some circular way. A notion of
common good in which different groups and different
interests can identify and, as such, should be the link
between the different social classes. The common good
does not presuppose identity of interests. Separation of
interests in the State represents one aspect of its reality.
For Green the common good exists in a partial sense.
While competition, hardship and class division remain,
the common good remains essentially a counsel of per-
fection, potentially present as the purpose of the perfect
State. The common good is thus present, for Green, in
the very fact of having a State and a community, in the
possibility of making the best of oneself in one’s social
function and seeking for the same for othersac.
Green does not allow there to be a fundamental di-
chotomy between personal and public good, not because
he is a collectivist as such, but rather because he sees a
non-contingent relationship between persons and society
so that an individual's possible self has an intrinsic
social dimension. This position and the arguments which
he uses to support it is crucial for his overall political phil-
osophy and for his conception of Liberalism. The argu-
ment seeks to establish the metaphysical basis of the view
that between classes, hierarchies and groups in a society
there is still a common good which all men share, what-
ever their differences in natural powers and social circum-
stances, and which is the basis for community lift, linking
all persons in society into one harmonious wholead. Green
concludes that society is ‘the condition of the development
of our personality’.
The mutual recognition of persons and their self rea-
lization do not require any fundamental change in the
present distribution of goods in society although it re-
quires certain kinds of social services to be provided
which are not in Green's time widely thought to be neces-
sary, those which bring a relief from the pressure of ani-
mal wants. Such a supply of the means of living allows
room for the consideration of the ends of living. But this
provision is not thought to be such as to fundamentally
alter property relationships in society. Mutual respect and
citizenship do not require a radical revision of inequalities.
Thus, the concept of citizenship represents a co-
ordination and subordination of individual actions towards
some common good. It also represents a respect and
realization of the moral worth of each person. Citizenship
is a prerequisite of true democracy based on respect.
To Idealists like Green, citizenship implies a noble
purpose. Citizenship is active and orientated to commu-
nity life. Citizenship endorses the unity of the conscienceof man and the public laws, of reason and authority, and
of spirit and the flesh. The concept of citizenship has
a remoteness, and somewhat lofty ring to it, even in
the 1900s. It presupposed an extensive educational
background and awareness, which is in itself a severe
drawbackae. It is clear that any theory of constructive
citizenship is going to have something to say about
educationaf.
Citizenship is considered awareness of the common
good and purpose of human life embedded in insti-
tutional forms of the State, and as such, is an active
practice, oriented to the community. For the Idealists
citizenship is not a protective and largely negative idea,
but “a historical, optimistic, promotional and ethical de-
vice, designed to enhance and develop positive freedom.
It is viewed essentially as the moral achievement of a
civilised community”ag.
Rights are seen as beneficial features which arose only
in a social situation. A right is seen as dependent on the
common good, in the sense that it is a power to act for
one’s own good, secured to the individual by the com-
munity, “on the supposition that its exercise contrib-
utes to the good of the community”ah. Rights, like laws
and institutions, are bound up with the realizations of in-
dividuals and their needs. “This foundation, in Green’s
view, means that an individual exercising rights is intrin-
sically, or involuntarily, recognizing the common good.
The capacity for rights in individuals is a social phe-
nomenon; it can be guided and moralized through such
institutions of society as the family. … unequal freedom of
contract, unlicensed drink traffic, and insanitary homes,
and going beyond Green’s stipulations, bad wages and
fluctuations and seasonal employment, could affect the in-
dividual’s capacity for exercising rights. It was through ra-
tional citizenship that a man became free and served the
common good”ai.
The moral capacity in each man is to Green “a con-
sciousness on the part of the subject of the capacity that
its realization is an end desirable in itself, and rights are
the condition of realizing it”aj. Thus, they are, in a sense,
“the negative realization of power”. They are not an arbi-
trary creation, neither are they antecedent to society, but
are created in a social situation and need to be recog-
nized by others in order to become rights. Green deals
summarily with natural right. Rights apart from society
are a contradiction. To ask why I accept rights pres-
cribed in society, or in fact to the power of the State,
would be like asking why I allow my life to be ruled by a
complex of institutions without which I should literally
have no life to call my own.
Rights are therefore defined by John MacCunn as “ad-
vantageous conditions of social well-being indispensable
to the true development of the citizen, enjoyable by all
members of the community, and which we are prepared
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other) to be enforced. The advantage of rights should be
for MacCunn, the opportunities they bringak.
The conception of citizenship becomes “a standard by
which our life—whether in the family, in the urban or
rural neighbourhood, in trade or industry, in the
Church, or in the work of charity—may be, and must be,
criticised if it is to be in the full sense human”al. Where
to criticize is “to adjust a part to its due and harmonious
relations with a whole.”
Because of the social problems faced by Britain and of
the political and philosophical debate in that decades, it
not surprising that a great attention was focused on the
need of overcoming “the wilderness of ‘interests’ which
constitute the texture of modern society” and of finding
any clue to a unity between our surroundings in which we
are imprisoned from birth, and the life and well-being
of our fellow-countrymen as a whole”am. Bosanquet’s
main preoccupation is to recover the unity principle
“which at first sight, may appear to have deserted the
modern world”an. Social fragmentation and the wilder-
ness of particular interests seem to be the reasons for
a new conception of the society and citizenship and a
new role of the State.
State and freedom
As Green maintained in his famous lecture, ‘Liberal Legis-
lation and Freedom of Contract’: “When we speak of free-
dom as something to be highly prized, we mean ‘a positive
power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth
doing”. This enjoyment was something we experienced in
common with others. Measurement of the progress of so-
ciety was thus by the development and exercise of powers
contributory to the common good. Happiness was only a
by product of the moral imperative to pursue the self-
development and to became a rational citizenao.
Social institutions or legal practices, for Green, are jus-
tified only to the extent that they furthered the self-
realisation of individuals. The citizen is not simply a the
passive recipient of rights, but rather an active self-
realising being. Green viewed all political concepts from
this standpoint. Rights, obligations, property or freedom
were devices to allow individuals to realise their powers
and abilities.
This includes defence of the State in the name of free-
dom, as it is to ensure freedom from suffering, without
which the moral life cannot be lived. Underlying the idea
of citizenship is this new concept of freedom, a freedom
based on power to do and to take part; the idea of citi-
zenship that focuses on individual skills and equality of
opportunity developed within a competitive society.
Positive freedom is identified with rational and moral
action, a reconciliation of the objects of will and the ob-
jects of reason, that is willing the common goodap.By the 1890s and 1900s the State is beginning to be
viewed as an integral part of economic and political life.
The State is therefore a moral agent, with ideals and
purposes which it formulated and pursued for the bet-
terment of society as a whole. Within the idealist per-
spective, there is no separation between the State and its
citizens; on the contrary, a good State and good citizens
go hand in hand. According to Jones “The power of the
good State empowers the citizen, and the power of the
good citizen empowers the State”aq. The perfection and
moral condition of a State is dependent upon the degree
of citizenship in its membership. “Thus if the State pro-
visionally represented the common purposes of individ-
uals, it could be seen figuratively as a single individual
being the representation of the common purposes of all
men within it. Again, most of the Idealists identified true
individuality, citizenship and self-development with free-
dom. Real freedom was not the absence of compulsion
but the maximum of power for all members of society to
make the best of themselves”ar.
For all Idealists, “the State is comprised of numer-
ous social organisms—the family, class, clan, church
and city—and each individual inevitably belongs to mul-
tiple groupings and associations. … The State for the Ide-
alists is therefore not only the apparatus of governance,
but is also inclusive of the whole social organism.… By as-
sociating sovereignty with the State, Idealists posited a
general will which was the ‘real will’ of the community
and of which the real will of each individual was a mani-
festation. Organised society is seen to embody an ideal of
life, along with the will to pursue more elevated and re-
warding ends than any single individual can attain on his
or her own”as.
Nineteenth-century individualists often viewed society
either as an aggregate of embodying separate atoms or
an organism. The communitarian-inclined theories of
the Idealists thus had to combat both utilitarianism in-
dividualism and the organic individualism of Herbert
Spence and Leslie Stephen. Utilitarianism was one of the
dominant vocabularies and Bradley and Green, amongst
others, criticised it for failing to account for moral and
political activity. Morality, for the Idealists, was social in
character. Acting morally entailed a reciprocal concern
for others, and not merely a desire to achieve a private
State of mind like happiness or utility”at. For the Ideal-
ists, individualists neglected the spiritual nature of the
social organism, which is neither mechanical nor bio-
logical, but instead depends upon the relation in which
each person stands with every other. “The sinews and
ligaments of society are the moral ideas and personal re-
lations, without which a society would be a mere aggre-
gation.” The theory of the Idealists entailed a wide range
of moral duties, responsibilities and obligations. These
moral notions were conceived of as binding on the State
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stitution which aimed at a common goodau.
The moral function of law, rights and the State was
the fundamental concern of Green’s political philosophy.
The aim of the law was to provide conditions for the de-
velopment of man’s capacities and powers towards a
moral end of self-realization. The capacity of institutions
to achieve this end was the criterion of their moral de-
velopment and progress. Civic institutions were there-
fore, in a sense, the outward expression of morality.
Thus the State as the repository of man’s idea of good,
reflected the moral consciousness of all menav.
Intervention by the State has the duty to provide and
maintain minimum conditions of life especially with
regards to health, work and education, with the awareness
that low wages and irregular employment limit individ-
uals’ capacity to exercise their rights. “Richtie saw the State
as the most adequate representative of the general will in
the community. For Bosanquet, it was the sustainer of the
rights which underpinned any good life. Without the State
the individual was nothing. This did not mean that the in-
dividual owed the State blind obedience. The State for the
Idealists was only a moral absolute when acting for the
common good. Green recognised that resistance, in
certain circumstances, was absolutely necessary”aw.
Jones, like many of his fellows Idealists, including
Caird, distinguished between true and false socialism.
True socialism was ethical and communitarian in nature
and provided conditions for individual moral develop-
ment. False socialism allowed no scope for individual
freedom. For many of the civic-minded Idealists, it was
the large cities, faced with the consequences of rapid in-
dustrial growth, that had to confront the issue of the ex-
tent to which the community should ‘interfere’, in order
to meliorate the plight of the disadvantaged. The Ideal-
ists refused to accept that there was an absolute oppos-
ition between the individual and the State. The liberal
socialist State could not make men moral, but, it could
remove the obstacles to self-realisationax.
It was in this light that the State was viewed by the
Idealists as an institution embodying the mind and pur-
pose of its members, not members or parts as in a ma-
chine, but living, independent, rational and organic
members. The State was the most important institution,
since it united all the range of voluntary and statutory
associations and groups embodying more limited pur-
poses within themay.
Conclusions
Idealists defined a political theory which places a great
emphasis upon the moral vocation of citizenship and the
value of community organized around a common good.
Views of citizenship, the individual and the State which
connect political life with moral notions like humancapacities, self-respect, interdependence and mutual ob-
ligation, and which see will and voluntary commitment
at the basis of the State, are going to be classified as
metaphysicalaz. Unsurprisingly a liberal anarchist like
James M. Buchanan wrote that Idealists’ political phil-
osophy “put up barriers against any realistic examination
of politics.” Certainly their religious approach cannot be
understood and accepted by who pursues a secular vi-
sion of State and society, however a secular vision has to
find a solution to the internal contradiction posed by the
values’ presuppositions. Idealism fulfilled a number of
roles in societies that were experiencing the effects of
rapid industrialisation, modernisation and secularisation.
It acted as a counterbalance to the individualism of the
more brash variants of utilitarianism, offering a philoso-
phy that gave a much needed emphasis to social cohe-
siveness and to the closeness of the relation between
individual and collective responsibility. Its emphasis on
the importance of active social citizenship became an
important theme in early twentieth-century politics and
welfare theory. Against the conception of humanity in
naturalistic theories of evolution, Idealists offered an ele-
vated view of the relation between humanity and natureba.
The emphasis on the unity of nature and spirit, the com-
prehensive view of the world and inclusive view of the so-
ciety, the prospection of a third way in between socialism
and individualism are the main characters which suggest
that Idealists had an influence on Geddes and his ideas on
planningbb. Moreover their ideas of citizenship and of the
relationships between the individual and the State are still
issues for the current debates.
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